Public data shows that a certain amount of semiconductor equipment continues to flow to Russia, but it does not specify who sold it, nor does it indicate whether these semiconductor equipment actually fall into the sanctioned category. This makes it extremely difficult to curb the flow of semiconductors from China to Russia.
The United States, which invented the microchip, has now threatened to sanction anyone who dares to sell many, if not most, different types of chips to Russia. However, recent leaks, as well as some publicly available figures, clearly show that shipments of chips continue to arrive on Russian shores. The chip trade is centered on China and is believed to involve several other countries acting as intermediaries, including Turkey.
It’s a cliché to talk about the global trade web’s resilience to sanctions and tariffs: Another classic recent example is global energy markets, which are adjusting with alarming speed in the face of the West’s decision to wean itself off Russian energy. But stemming the flow of semiconductors that are used in everyday appliances to military equipment is a particularly thorny issue.
A key reason for the inability to stop semiconductors from entering Russia is China's refusal to join Western efforts to sanction Russia, which is at the center of the global chip trade. China is not only the world's electronics industry production base, but also the world's largest chip importer, and China itself is also an important producer of low-performance chips. China's publicly released export statistics also omit detailed information on trade with overseas business partners.
